By: Kaelea Shaner (she/her)
Last December, I had the privilege of writing a piece for the National LGBTQ+ Bar’s Prima Facie blog on the state of conversion therapy, the then-pending Supreme Court case Chiles v. Salazar, and what it could mean for my fellow law students and the legal profession writ large. Now, as 2026 draws to a close, we turn to another issue affecting transgender people like myself: the trans panic defense.
November 20 marks Transgender Day of Remembrance. It began as an observance in 1999 when trans advocate Gwendolyn Ann Smith organized a vigil honoring Rita Hester, a transgender woman killed the prior year. The purpose of this day is to hold space for lives lost to anti-transgender violence, to remember our siblings who have been taken from us. It is also about ensuring that those names are not forgotten by institutions responsible for administering justice and ensuring safety and well-being for all.
On October 5, 2026, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals gave our community a particular reason to reflect as we observe TDOR this year. In its decision, State v. Samuel Ward, Jr., the court vacated a voluntary manslaughter conviction because the jury had not been told that Paris Lee, the victim, was assigned male at birth. This decision warrants some scrutiny for both the way in which it hearkens to trans panic defenses and for its presumptions about gender, fear, and power dynamics.
The National LGBTQ+ Bar Association describes LGBTQ+ panic as a strategy that uses a victim’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity to reduce or avoid criminal responsibility. The strategy has, in some cases, contributed to acquittals, convictions on lesser charges, or lighter sentences. It operates through established doctrines such as provocation, diminished capacity, and self-defense, rather than as a standalone affirmative defense. Some versions rely on claimed shock at discovering that a victim is transgender; others portray an already-known identity as a reason for fear.
Paris Lee was a 36-year-old Black transgender woman. On June 29, 2022, Samuel Ward Jr. shot her six times at her home in Shelby County, Tennessee. A jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter in May 2025, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in prison.
Ward claimed self-defense. He told police that Lee had pointed a gun at him and that he fired while falling down a staircase. A firearms examiner identified one casing fired from Lee’s gun and seven from Ward’s. The physical evidence raised questions about Ward’s account, and investigators described inconsistencies in his statements about their positions. Additionally, several of Lee’s wounds demonstrated downward trajectories. After the shooting, he drove approximately thirty minutes away before calling police.
Before trial, prosecutors sought to exclude references to Lee’s sex assigned at birth. They told the court that Lee and Ward had been in a relationship for at least two years and that Ward already knew she was transgender. There was therefore no claim here of a sudden discovery that she was trans. Rather, the defense argued that her assigned sex at birth mattered to their relative strength and the degree of fear he experienced.
The trial judge excluded the information, reasoning that Lee’s assigned sex at birth did not affect the deadliness of the firearm. The appellate court disagreed. It held that the exclusion misapplied the rules of evidence and infringed Ward’s constitutional right to present a defense. Importantly, the court did find the evidence sufficient to support the manslaughter conviction. It acknowledged that the jury was entitled to reject a self-defense argument. Its ruling orders a new trial. But the concern here lies in the reasoning that treated her sex assigned at birth as critical to Ward’s defense.
For far too long, trans people have been subjected to enormous amounts of violence, scrutiny, and harassment. When we reason that someone’s status as trans provides an additional measure of supposedly reasonable fear, we must ask ourselves why. The opinion’s reasoning risks treating trans women as men for purposes of assessing danger, and treating their sex assigned at birth as a reason to find them more frightening than cisgender women. The court’s appeal to “inherent physiological differences between the sexes that science continues to reveal and that we choose not to ignore” relies on a broad generalization about sex. The jury was made aware of Lee’s height and weight, raising the question of which additional “physiological differences” mattered to this particular confrontation. The court stated that “[a] detailed discussion is not necessary for our analysis; it suffices to acknowledge that these differences exist.”
A detailed explanation was precisely what this reasoning needed. The opinion cites no scientific research supporting its inference about Lee’s strength and does not explain how its generalizations describe her individual physical capabilities. It jumps from acknowledging differences between groups to treating one person’s birth designation as substantially critical to a defense against killing her.
The opinion goes on to say that excluding Lee’s status as trans “left the jury with the impression that a male defendant killed a female victim.” That is precisely what occurred here, and treating the jury’s recognition of Lee as a woman as a distortion is both transphobic and logically flawed. Relative size and strength can matter to self-defense, but an impartial assessment should examine the specific confrontation and the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in imminent danger. It should never treat transgender status as a proxy for dangerousness or a reason to discount a victim’s life. The implication is difficult to escape: knowledge that she was transgender was expected to change how jurors understood the violence against her. The court’s framing treats the jury’s understanding of Lee as a woman as a source of unfairness to the man who killed her.
TGEU’s 2026 Trans Murder Monitoring update recorded 273 reported murders of transgender and gender-diverse people worldwide between October 1, 2025, and September 30, 2026. It reported that 95 percent of victims were transgender women or transfeminine people and roughly three-quarters were Black or Brown. These figures represent documented cases rather than a complete count; TGEU warns that reporting gaps and limited monitoring capacity leave additional killings unrecorded.
A court’s willingness to treat our identities as an explanation for someone else’s fear carries with it an all too familiar warning. We can be victims of violence and still find ourselves cast as the source of danger. We can be seen for who we are by one court and misgendered in another. We can be in a relationship with someone who ostensibly accepts us for who we are, only to find ourselves victimized by them.
Nevertheless, many state legislatures have worked to address this. Delaware, for instance, expressly bars justifying force or mitigating criminal responsibility based on a victim’s actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, or sex assigned at birth. The American Bar Association adopted Resolution 113A in 2013, urging legislative action against gay and trans panic arguments. This case, however, illustrates why reforms must reach identity-based claims of reasonable fear as well as claims of sudden provocation. A law focused exclusively on the moment a defendant discovers someone is transgender leaves substantial room for this same prejudice to operate in other doctrines and criminal defenses.
This November 20, we will once again say the names of the people whose lives were taken from us. Paris Lee belongs in that remembrance. For those of us in the legal profession, honoring her memory and those like her, like us, requires urgency to ensure that justice applies equally to LGBTQ+ victims of violence.